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ABSTRACT 
In recent counterterrorism efforts, several states have embarked on a new 
approach to the problem of countering radicalization of imprisoned extremists.  Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Singapore have all implemented ideological-based 
deradicalization programs that attempt to change the ideologies held by these extremists 
and eventually allow for their release from prison and reintegration into normal society.  
Many factors seen in the deradicalization process are similar to those found in 
disengagement from a variety of other anti-social behaviors, including joining gangs, 
cults, and racist groups. They include engaging in ideological discussions, offering 
avenues for reintegration, and using family and peers as alternative networks of support 
to replace the radical milieu of extremism. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and 
Indonesia have each utilized some of these deradicalization techniques with varying 
degrees of success. Additionally, each country has approached the deradicalization 
process in a different way.  Six general lessons emerge from these cases: success depends 
on the availability of: (1) adequate funding, (2) reform within the prison structure, (3) use 
of knowledgeable and well-respected Islamic clerics, (4) incorporation of cultural norms, 
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The past decade has witnessed several terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists who 
have either targeted Western interests or sought to overthrow secular regimes in the 
Muslim world. These radical Muslims share a similar ideology that justifies the use of 
violence against non-Muslims or governments considered un-Islamic. The radicalization 
of these Muslims has become a main concern in the counterterrorism efforts of 
governments throughout the world. As a result of significant counterterrorism efforts, 
several countries have captured and imprisoned large numbers of radical Muslim 
extremists. The challenge for these governments is what to do with these extremist prison 
populations and how best to rehabilitate them to avoid a return to violent militancy.  
Several countries have now taken a softer approach in their counterterrorism 
efforts in part due to the recognition that the war against extremism requires an 
ideological dimension.1 A potential answer to this challenge is to counter the extremist 
ideology and find a way for captured militants to cohabitate peacefully with normal 
society. This new approach consists of a rehabilitation-focused deradicalization program 
that targets imprisoned extremists. The core assumption of this approach is that 
extremists have been led astray by their recruiters and, consequently, harbor incorrect 
understanding of Islam. Rehabilitation is a possible solution to the problem of housing 
security prisoners for an indeterminate amount of time. Also, prisons are ideal locations 
for deradicalization programs due to the measures of control that can be implemented in a 
prison setting. 
Deradicalization programs are comprised of a variety of approaches aimed at 
extremists. One approach is to change the extremists’ interpretation concerning the 
meaning of jihad and the concept of takfir. Another approach is to distance the individual 
from extremist groups. A third approach is to help reintegrate the individual back into 
normal society. These deradicalization programs target the extremist ideologies held by 
                                                 
1 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism’: A Fundamentally Different Strategy,” 
Middle East Policy 13, no. 3 (2006): 101. 
 2
the individuals and many of the programs attempt to provide economic incentives and 
social assistance to program participants. The current efforts examined in this thesis are 
prison-based rehabilitation programs focusing on the individual extremist. Countries like 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia and Singapore have received much publicity about their 
recent programs aimed towards deradicalizing and rehabilitating individual militants.  
Deradicalization programs may be a potential answer to the problem of what to do 
with imprisoned religious extremists but the effectiveness of these programs is not 
known. Are these deradicalization programs an effective solution to dealing with the 
large numbers of imprisoned extremists? What are the key components of 
deradicalization programs for religious extremists and how do they compare with the 
factors seen in disengagement from other types of anti-social groups, including terrorists, 
gangs, cults, and racist groups? What are the similarities and differences among the 
current programs? Are there specific practices that have met with success or failure? Are 
the existing programs unique to their context and culture within each state or can they be 
applied in different settings?  
A. IMPORTANCE  
In Iraq alone, the U.S. and allies have captured and imprisoned approximately 
160,000 suspected insurgents since the start of the war.2 In other areas of the world, such 
as Europe, North Africa and South Asia, the numbers of Islamist extremists detained are 
estimated at around 5,000 individuals.3 Although some security prisoners can be jailed 
indefinitely, most eventually have to be released. There may not be enough evidence to 
detain them indefinitely or the charges do not merit long-term sentences. Upon release, 
many militants will likely rejoin militant networks if no steps are taken to intervene.  
A study of global jihadist prison sentences reflected that approximately 15% of 
these jihadists receive death sentences or life imprisonment, while many others receive 
                                                 
2 James B. Brown, Erik W. Goepner, and James M. Clark, “Detention Operations, Behavior 
Modification, and Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 89, no. 3 (May/June 2009): 40. 
3 Dennis A. Pluchinsky, “Global Jihadist Recidivism: A Red Flag,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
31, no. 3 (2008): 183. 
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either 20 years or less or 10 years or less.4 The majority of these jihadists are often 
released even earlier through special pardons.5 Recidivism rates are disproportionately 
high among released extremists according to one scholar.6 An examination of radicals 
released from Moroccan, Yemeni, Algerian, and Egyptian prisons found that many 
former prisoners conducted terrorist attacks and suicide bombings after their release.7  
Prisons offer an ideal breeding ground for extremism. Prisons give extremists a 
chance to regroup, preach their radical ideologies and recruit new members. Many 
prisoners who were not radical prior to imprisonment become radicalized through the 
prison environment. A further stimulus for radicalization is the harsh interrogation 
techniques and torture that many prisoners are subjected to in some countries. Therefore, 
how does a state deal with imprisoned extremists? The debate on the closure of 
Guantanamo Bay prison is fueled by questions about what to do with the prisoners. 
Rehabilitation is a possible solution to the problem of housing security prisoners for an 
indeterminate amount of time. Much of the success of the programs will be dependent on 
the methods used and the availability of adequate funding.  
Deradicalization programs have been used in the past in places, such as Algeria 
and Egypt but these targeted the extremist groups rather than the individual. In addition, a 
major component of these programs was the use of severe repression rather than any 
attempts to change ideologies. Deradicalization through rehabilitation is a relatively new 
concept for dealing with imprisoned extremists. Currently, little information is available 
to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the programs. The process of deradicalization 
attempts more than just disengagement from a terrorist group. While there is abundant 
research available on the causes of radicalization, few studies have been done on what 
factors cause an individual to deradicalize. However, numerous studies have been done 
on disengagement from other anti-social organizations, such as street gangs, right-wing  
 
                                                 
4 Pluchinsky, “Global Jihadist Recidivism: A Red Flag,” 183. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 184. 
7 Ibid. 
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extremist groups, and other terrorist groups. This thesis examines the components within 
the selected deradicalization programs and compares them to the factors commonly seen 
within the disengagement process. 
Deradicalization programs have been implemented in a number of countries with 
religious extremist prison populations. While these programs share some of the same 
characteristics, they also differ tremendously due to the resources available within each 
country. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia and Singapore have utilized deradicalization 
programs for the past five years and have claimed varying degrees of success within their 
programs. Additionally, each country has approached the deradicalization process in a 
different way.  
This thesis examines deradicalization programs targeting radical Islamists in 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, and Singapore. Each of these programs offers a unique 
approach in its attempts to deradicalize Islamist extremists. Three of the programs studied 
occur in predominately Islamic countries, while the fourth has been implemented in a 
country with a Muslim minority. Each state has been able to provide varying resources to 
their respective programs. While some of the programs have shown some success, others 
appear to have failed to impact their target audience adequately. The programs are 
compared by evaluating their approach to deradicalization, assessing the inclusion of any 
disengagement factors within the programs, and assessing whether they commit or avoid 
the mistakes of previous deradicalization programs.  
B. FINDINGS 
The author’s findings show that a successful deradicalization program should, at a 
minimum, include the following: countering radical ideologies using knowledgeable and 
well-respected moderates, incorporation of cultural norms of the target community, 
involvement of families and communities in the deradicalization process, and structured 
after-care programs to prevent recidivism. 
The author uses an evaluative, comparative approach towards examining the 
effectiveness of the deradicalization programs. The initial approach consists of a review 
of disengagement studies to identify common factors found in disengagement from a 
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variety of anti-social organizations. The main anti-social groups examined are other 
terrorist groups from the past, street gangs, right-wing extremist groups, and religious 
cults. In addition, previous deradicalization processes for Islamist extremists in states, 
such as Egypt and Algeria are studied to identify what factors were present and what 
similarities they show with programs aimed at individuals.  
Also examined and compared are the deradicalization programs aimed at 
individuals,, such as those seen in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, and Singapore. What 
are the similarities and differences in the methods used by each country and what results 
have the different programs produced? Do these programs create the same factors seen in 
the disengagement process? Also, what can be learned from these previous experiences?  
The relatively newness of these programs prevents a comprehensive study of their 
effectiveness. Additionally, it is hard to evaluate recidivism rates in these various 
deradicalization programs, as records are often not publically disclosed. For the programs 
to be effective, states must dedicate a large number of resources to address detainee 
issues both within the prison system and after the detainee is released. Many developing 
countries do not have the resources to address the needs of the participant adequately. 
Recent media coverage has highlighted the problem of recidivism for deradicalization 
program participants particularly within Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In short, rather than 
evaluate the ongoing deradicalization programs in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, and 
Singapore by looking at their recidivism rates, instead their potential effectiveness is 
assessed by looking at how closely they follow earlier models of disengagement applied 
in other countries and deemed successful by experts. This approach has its limits because 
previous attempts at deradicalization may have been influenced by different economic 
and political contexts, as well as different cultures. Therefore, the findings of this study 
should be seen as preliminary, not conclusive. The ultimate test of effectiveness depends 
on abundant and reliable data on recidivism rates in these countries. 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is concerned with rehabilitation-based programs that also attempt to 
change the ideologies of the individual extremist. The process of deradicalization varies 
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with each individual. Current deradicalization programs also vary in their approach. The 
methods of each program depend upon many factors to include the cultural mores within 
each country and the resources available for the program. To evaluate these individual-
based deradicalization programs, the author first identifies common factors seen in the 
disengagement process. Next, group-focused deradicalization programs are examined to 
identify factors, which led to success or failure. Four case studies on deradicalization 
programs targeting individuals are presented. The conclusion summarizes the common 
elements needed to implement a successful deradicalization program. 
Chapter II begins with an explanation of the two different concepts of 
deradicalization and disengagement. There are two levels of analysis in both 
disengagement and deradicalization with one targeting groups while the other targets the 
individual. Chapter II highlights disengagement theories and the scholarly consensus on 
why individuals disengage from other anti-social groups, such as street gangs, Neo-Nazi 
groups, secular terrorist groups and religious cults. Chapter II also examines the factors 
seen in the disengagement of Islamist extremists in Egypt and Algeria. Algeria’s 
approach did not engage in any ideological or rehabilitative-based strategy, while the 
deradicalization efforts in Egypt came from within the extremist group and was not 
initially facilitated by the state. 
Chapter III examines the deradicalization efforts in Yemen. Yemen was one of 
the first countries to undertake deradicalization efforts aimed at individual extremists. 
Initial deradicalization efforts had limited success and the program was shelved for some 
time due to high rates of recidivism. In addition, the program lacked several of the factors 
necessary for the deradicalization process. The program has since resurfaced although it 
still suffers from a lack of adequate resources and funding. 
Chapter IV is a case study of Saudi Arabia. This chapter examines the 
deradicalization efforts in Saudi Arabia. It has one of the most well-funded and 
comprehensive deradicalization programs in existence. The program has some similar 
factors to those seen in other programs, such as Yemen’s; however, the Saudis have 
addressed many of the failures seen in previous attempts. Initial reviews of the Saudi  
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program show a high rate of success as compared to other programs. The Saudi program 
also enjoys more intensive scrutiny as other states seek to implement their own programs, 
based upon the current success of the Saudi program.  
Chapter V provides a case study of deradicalization efforts in Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s program contains some similar factors to those seen in Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen. Indonesia has also incorporated different methods than other programs due not 
only to cultural differences but also to the limited resources that Indonesia has in place to 
implement its program. Despite its lack of resources, Indonesia’s program has resulted in 
significant success in the deradicalization of some extremist leaders. 
Chapter VI provides an overview of the deradicalization program in Singapore. 
Unlike the previous three case studies, Singapore’s deradicalization program has been 
implemented in a non-Muslim majority state. Singapore’s imprisoned extremists 
comprise a much smaller percentage of the overall prison population. Singapore also is 
able to dedicate significant resources to the implementation of its program. 
Chapter VII provides a conclusion of the research on the effectiveness of 
deradicalization programs targeting Islamist extremists. This chapter assesses the current 
theories and realities of disengagement and deradicalization. It provides conclusions on 
how the current programs fit with the theories. It also discusses what factors need to be 
present for a deradicalization program to be successful. 
 8
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II. THEORIES OF DISENGAGEMENT AND 
DERADICALIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are key distinctions between the concepts of disengagement and 
deradicalization. Disengagement occurs when an individual or a group no longer engages 
in violence or the individual no longer participates in the violent activities of the group. 
Deradicalization occurs when a group or an individual no longer believes in a violent 
ideology.  
Deradicalization programs aimed at imprisoned extremists attempt to change the 
ideologies held by these extremists and eventually allow for release from prison and 
return of the rehabilitated extremist back into normal society. While deradicalization 
programs are a relatively new phenomenon, individuals have been disengaging from anti-
social groups for a long time. The key difference between deradicalization and 
disengagement from a terrorist organization is that disengagement means that the 
individual has left the group but has not necessarily changed his or her ideology.  
Horgan described disengagement as a process in which the individual’s role 
within an organization changes from violent participation to a less active role.8 Horgan 
found that disengagement alone does not necessarily bring about deradicalization nor is 
deradicalization a “necessary accompaniment to disengagement.”9 Horgan also found the 
process of disengagement to be different for each individual.10 However, the factors seen 
in disengagement may provide the tools to build a strategy towards deradicalization.  
Factors seen in the disengagement process consist of both physical and 
psychological factors. Psychological factors may include negative influences from the 
                                                 
8 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2009), 152. 
9 John Horgan, “Individual Disengagement, A Psychological Analysis,” in Leaving Terrorism Behind, 
Individual and Collective Disengagement, ed. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2009), 
28. 
10 John Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement?: A Process in Need of Clarity and a 
Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation,” Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 4 (February 2008): 5. 
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organization, development of negative sentiments towards the group, changing priorities 
for the individual, or disillusionment with the political aims and actions of the 
organization.11 Physical factors in disengagement can consist of apprehension and 
imprisonment by security services, being kicked out of the organization, or even a change 
of the individual’s role within the organization.12  
There are numerous studies on disengagement from both mainstream 
organizations and anti-social groups. Ebaugh examined the processes of role exit in 
individuals leaving both mainstream and non-typical roles. The initial stage of role exit 
begins when an individual begins to doubt his/her commitment to an organization.13 
These doubts are often brought about by sudden changes within the organization or a 
traumatic event.14 Individuals often express these doubts by exhibiting cueing behaviors, 
which question their commitment. Significant others, such as family and close friends can 
be influential in whether the individual continues to exhibit doubts and to seek alternative 
roles.15 Subsequent specific events often described as “the straw that broke the camel’s 
back” tend to be the catalyst for an individual to break with a group or organization 
formally.16 
A study on deprogramming and disengagement from cults found that more 
individuals left the cults due to a change in their ideological beliefs about the cults rather 
than due to forced participation in deprogramming.17 However, disengagement from the 
religious cult and deradicalization were more likely to occur together when members 
were forcibly removed from the cult.18 Another study found four major triggering factors 
                                                 
11 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005), 149. 
12 Ibid., 150. 
13 Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh, Becoming an EX, The Process of Role Exit (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988), 41. 
14 Ibid., 65. 
15 Ibid., 75. 
16 Ibid., 128. 
17 Anson D. Shupe, Jr. and David G. Bromley, “The Moonies and the Anti-Cultists: Movement and 
Countermovement in Conflict,” Sociological Analysis 40, no. 4 (Winter 1979): 332. 
18 Marc Galanter, Cults: Faith, Healing and Coercion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
175. 
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in the likelihood for an individual to disengage from a cult. One factor was the degree of 
insulation from larger society. A cult member who interacted with society outside of the 
cult was more likely to defect from the cult.19 A second factor involved the degree of 
personal relationships outside of the cult. Intimacy to another person outside of the cult 
weakened an individual’s obligation to the cult and increased the likelihood of 
defection.20 The third factor involved the perceived “urgency of the mission.”21 If the 
cult member did not perceive the demands of the cult to be necessary and urgent to the 
mission, the member was more likely to defect.22 A fourth factor in defection was the 
ability of the cult to fulfill the emotional needs of the individual. If the individual did not 
experience strong cohesion within the cult, the individual would be more likely to 
defect.23 This study also found that defectors often left the cult after “a major 
disillusionment or crisis” occurred and that family ties were influential in the decision to 
leave.24 
Some of the factors seen in disengagement from religious cults can also be seen in 
disengagement from underground, violent, political groups. In a study of terrorists and 
underground political groups in Italy, della Porta found that the higher the intensity of 
support to a group, the more difficult it is for an individual to leave the group.25 
Defections were also caused by internal conflicts within the group over ideologies and 
tactics.26 Family and career commitments were other factors in an individual’s  
 
                                                 
19 Stuart A. Wright, Leaving Cults: The Dynamics of Defection (Washington, D.C.: Society for the 
Scientific Study of Religion, 1987), 25. 
20 Ibid., 31. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 44. 
24 Ibid., 53–57. 
25 Donatella della Porta, “Leaving Underground Organizations, A Sociological Analysis of the Italian 
Case,” in Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement, ed. Tore Bjorgo and John 
Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2009), 75. 
26 Ibid., 77. 
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disengagement from the political group.27 Another factor causing individuals to 
disengage from the group was “burn-out,” which resulted from stresses of a commitment 
that was too demanding of an individual’s time or emotional capabilities.28 
Studies of ex-gang members have shown that the majority leave the gang due to 
the level of violence experienced by them or by their families and friends.29 Gang 
members also disengaged as they became older due to the increasing involvement and 
responsibilities associated with starting a family and involvement in legitimate 
employment.30 Decker and Lauritsen’s findings suggest that intervention appears to be 
more successful when it takes place immediately following acts of violence.31 
Bjorgo offers a number of factors on why many individuals disengage from right-
wing extremist groups. He makes a distinction between push factors, which consist of 
negative social forces and pull factors, which offer a more rewarding alternative.32 Push 
factors may consist of a loss of faith in the ideology of the group or the feelings that the 
violence went too far or even the loss of confidence in the group.33 Push factors are often 
the result of disillusion with either the activities or the ideologies of the group. The loss 
of standing or reputation within the group can push the individual to exit the group. The 
negative societal pressures due to involvement with a group can also cause an individual 
to leave. 
Some of the pull factors consist of a “longing for the freedoms of a ‘normal’ life” 
or the feelings that the individuals are too old to continue engaging in the anti-social  
 
                                                 
27 della Porta, “Leaving Underground Organizations, A Sociological Analysis of the Italian Case,” 79. 
28 Ibid., 80. 
29 Scott Decker and Janet Lauritsen, “Breaking the Bonds of Membership, Leaving the Gang,” in 
Gangs in America, ed. C. Ronald Huff (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996), 110. 
30 Ibid., 111. 
31 Ibid., 121. 
32 Tore Bjorgo, “Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right,” in Leaving 
Terrorism behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement, ed. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 36. 
33 Ibid., 38. 
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activities of the group.34 Bjorgo found that the establishment of intimate relationships 
outside of the group,, such as with a spouse or a child, was the strongest pull factor for an 
individual to leave a militant racist or nationalist group.35 
Bjorgo continues with an examination of the methods used by individuals to 
disengage. These include making a public break from the organization, breaking with the 
group while still maintaining the ideology, and a gradual withdrawal from the group.36 Of 
interest, Bjorgo also offered factors, which inhibit individuals from disengaging from 
anti-social groups. If the group provides positive characteristics, such as friendship and 
social support, the individual often remains loyal to the group even when not agreeing 
with the ideology.37 Individuals may also resist leaving an anti-social group due to the 
lack of social bonds available outside of the group or lack of employment opportunities 
as a result of their group membership.38 Fear of reprisal from the group may also inhibit 
an individual from leaving. Individuals who leave groups are often threatened with death 
or are subject to harassment from other members. Leaving a group also involves losing 
the protection of that group against potential enemies.39 Individuals who leave are also 
exposed to negative sanctions from security services that may target the individual in 
hopes of obtaining information on the group.40  
A number of scholars have also studied disengagement factors of groups. Cronin 
found seven explanations for the decline or ending of a terrorist group. The elements 
include; the capture or killing of the terrorist group leader, the failure of a goal or cause to 
transition to the next generation, achievement of the cause, transition to legitimate 
political participation, loss of popular support, repression by the state, or transition to 
                                                 
34 Bjorgo, “Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right,” 39. 
35 Ibid., 40. 
36 Ibid., 42–43. 





other violence.41 The recognition of these elements can provide opportunity for a state to 
exploit these conditions and potentially lead to the demise of the terrorist organization. 
Both Egypt and Algeria initiated programs geared towards disengaging Islamist 
extremist groups. Egypt’s and Algeria’s programs are different from rehabilitation-based 
deradicalization programs as the predominant method used is repression. Additionally, 
the programs do not include much effort in reintegrating the released prisoner back into 
normal society. In his research on extremist Islamist groups in Egypt and Algeria, Ashour 
argued that a specific combination of factors could lead to disengagement from violence. 
Ashour found that state repression and selective inducements by the government 
combined with an extremist group’s charismatic leadership and social interaction 
between individuals within and outside the group can move the group towards 
disengagement.42  
These factors can clearly be seen in the Algerian case particularly with the 
militant groups who accepted an amnesty offer from the Algerian government after 
intense repression. Some of these Islamist militant groups were already in unofficial 
dialogue with the regime prior to the amnesties and had already declared ceasefires with 
the government. The amnesty simply served to formalize and continue this arrangement. 
Also, these groups had leaderships that were able to control and/or influence a significant 
number within the groups. 
Algeria’s approach to extremism attempted to deradicalize groups using harsh 
state repression in addition to offering selective incentives to those willing to disarm.43 
Algeria’s harsh repression tactics consisted largely of “imprisonment, torture, extra-
judicial killings and media smear campaigns.”44 An Algerian government committee 
disclosed that approximately 500,000 terrorism suspects were detained during the 
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1990s.45 In addition, the committee placed the number of “disappeared persons” to be 
more than 10,000.46 Algeria’s approach was unique in that it lacked an 
ideological/theological component, which could have been used to delegitimize the use of 
violence.47 
Group disengagement factors identified by both Cronin and Ashour, can also be 
found in the case of Egypt. Egypt’s al-Jihad al-Islami and Gama’a al-Islamiya were the 
two main groups operating in the country for a number of years. Both were responsible 
for almost all of the terrorism within Egypt from the 1970s to the 1990s.48 In July 1997, 
leaders from both groups issued a public declaration to no longer conduct violent 
operations.49 Gama’a al-Islamiya had a strong, established leadership with broad 
authority over group members.50 The level of respect held by these leaders allowed them 
successfully to persuade group members to revise their ideologies. The Egyptian 
government aided in the deradicalization process by facilitating meetings between the 
reformed leadership and imprisoned group members.51 
A major contributor to this ideological revision was the effective use of state 
repression against the groups. Egypt’s use of force against the groups decimated much of 
the membership and crushed their capabilities for combat. Numerous group members 
were either killed in clashes against government forces or were captured and imprisoned 
for long lengths of time. Both Gama’a al-Islamiya and al-Jihad had also lost crucial 
public support in their struggles against the state. They alienated the Egyptian population  
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through their violent actions against both Egyptians and foreign tourists. The loss of 
public support resulted in an inability for the Islamist groups to continue to confront the 
state.52 
B. CONCLUSION 
Studies on individual disengagement from a variety of anti-social groups highlight 
many similar factors. One main factor is the disillusion with the ideologies or actions of 
the group. Another factor is a change in the individual’s commitment to the group, which 
can be brought on by sudden changes within the group or the occurrence of a traumatic 
event. A major factor that influenced the disengagement from a group was the influence 
of family and close friends outside the group. Commitment to a family or the 
establishment of an intimate relationship outside the group was another primary factor in 
the disengagement of individuals from a number of different organizations. Individuals 
who had social bonds outside the group were less dependent upon the group and more 
able to disengage. Apprehension or imprisonment also became prominent factors in 
disengagement.  
Studies on extremist group disengagement show a number of similar factors also. 
State repression has proven a major factor in the demise of a terrorist organization. The 
capture or killing of the extremist group leader can be a factor in the decline of the group. 
On the other side, strong leadership within a group has also proven highly effective in 
influencing and controlling the other group members. Government incentives can also 
positively influence disengagement of the group. The loss of public support also tends to 
lead to a decline in an organization. Another factor that has proven influential is the 
social interactions between individuals within the group and between group members and 
the outside world. 
These studies suggest that both disengagement and deradicalization are possible. 
More importantly, they provide the elements necessary for promoting disengagement and 
deradicalization. These elements are the effective use of state repression,, such as 
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imprisonment, effective use of government incentives to the individual, inclusion of 
family in the deradicalization process, strengthening of social bonds outside the extremist 
group, increased interaction of the individual with larger society, promotion of a change 
to the individual’s ideology, and the building of a moderate social or support network for 
the individual after disengagement from the group. 
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III. CASE STUDY: YEMEN’S DERADICALIZATION 
INITIATIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Yemeni government has had a complex and changing relationship with 
Islamist jihadists. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, thousands of Yemenis 
were believed to have traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the fight against the 
Soviets.53 Arab-Afghan fighters from Yemen and other Arab states were allowed to 
return and resettle within Yemen by the Yemeni government. Their expertise was 
subsequently used by the regime in containing various internal conflicts within Yemen. 
The return of jihadists to Yemen also caused problems for the regime. These jihadists 
brought with them an ideology calling for the establishment of an Islamic state within 
Yemen. Recent years have been marked with increased conflict in Yemen between the 
government and these groups. A number of al-Qaeda members are believed to originate 
from Yemen.  
In the past decade, Yemen has experienced a significant number of terrorist 
attacks on its soil targeting both western interests and Yemen’s economic and tourism 
sectors. There have been numerous attacks to include bombings of hotels, killings of 
western tourists, killings of U.S. citizens working in a Yemeni hospital and attacks 
targeting the U.S. embassy in Yemen. Maritime terrorism in Yemen has included the 
bombings of a U.S. warship in 2000 and a French commercial ship in 2002. These 
attacks, coupled with the 9/11 attacks in the United States, brought increased 
international pressure for the Yemeni government to take action against radical 
extremists inside Yemen. As a result, Yemeni security services arrested and imprisoned 
large numbers of both active and suspected extremists throughout Yemen.  
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Yemen was one of the first countries to initiate a program designed to 
deradicalize jihadists using religious dialogue. The foundation of this approach was that 
extremists held ideologies that fueled terrorism and these ideologies could be 
successfully debated and moderated to reduce terrorist activities. The basis of the 
program was to convert imprisoned jihadists’ ideologies from “a radical, militant 
understanding of Islam to a moderate and peaceful understanding.”54 
Yemen’s deradicalization approach through ideological debate has been 
implemented in a number of other countries. Although Yemen’s initial approach was 
only partially effective, Yemen’s program provides an example of what factors may 
allow for success and what may lead to failure in a deradicalization program. This 
chapter provides an overview of the key components of Yemen’s deradicalization 
program. It also compares these components with disengagement factors. Many 
criticisms of the program are also highlighted. 
B. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, 
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh decided to establish a committee to engage in 
dialogue with extremists in hopes of changing their “dangerous beliefs which could 
translate into violent extremism.”55 In September 2002, the Yemeni government 
appointed Judge Hamoud al-Hitar to lead the Committee for Religious Dialogue. The 
Dialogue Committee consisted of Judge al-Hitar and five other religious experts.56 The 
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Afghanistan and other people who held ideological views outside of the norm.57 This 
committee focused on security detainees suspected of being involved with Islamic 
extremism and the program relied on voluntary participation.58  
The main issues debated within the dialogue were the legitimacy of the Yemeni 
government, the permissibility of killing non-Muslims, and the appropriate utilization of 
jihad. The dialogue between the committee and jihadists was based on the Qur’an and 
sunna and the purpose of the dialogue was to convince the jihadists to recognize the 
Yemeni government’s authority, respect the rights of non-Muslims, and refrain from 
violence within Yemen.59  
Judge al-Hitar based his dialogue program on the idea of mutual respect between 
the clerics and the detainees.60 Actual debates on beliefs did not occur until after the 
clerics had won the respect and trust of the detainees.61 At the initial meeting between the 
committee and the detainees, Judge al-Hitar addressed the criticisms of the detainees who 
questioned the legitimacy of the clerics and the role of the state in the dialogue process.62 
Upon gaining agreement of the detainees to participate in the dialogue, Hitar and the 
detainees agreed to an agenda and specific guidelines to follow for the dialogue.63 
Dialogue sessions usually occurred between the cleric and a group of three to 
seven detainees. Sessions lasted for several hours.64 Some reports indicate the sessions 
occurred outside the prison in a neutral setting.65 Other reports state the dialogue sessions 
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occurred within the prison.66 A neutral setting is important in putting the detainees on 
equal footing with the clerics and is more conductive to building mutual trust and 
respect.67 Each group was also told of positive outcomes and successes of other groups.68  
Clerics challenged the detainees by stating if the detainees could provide a 
convincing argument on the legitimacy of their jihad, then the clerics would join them but 
if they could not, then they must renounce their view.69 Judge al-Hitar and the other 
religious clerics asked detainees to use the Qur’an to justify the killing of innocent 
civilians and when they were unable to do so, the clerics would then show the detainees 
numerous passages within the Qur’an advocating nonviolence.70 According to Judge al-
Hitar, most of the detainees had memorized the Qur’an and were familiar with Islamic 
rules, yet they misused the rules.71 Clerics found that the hardcore detainees who had 
spent significant time in Afghanistan were more difficult to engage with in open 
dialogue.72  
Prisoners were told upfront that if they agreed to renounce violence that they 
would be released through an amnesty program.73 However, this amnesty did not extend 
to prisoners who had already killed people in terrorist attacks.74 Participants were also 
required to sign a pledge not to conduct terrorist attacks within Yemen.75 Some effort 
was made to find employment for the former detainees and some participants were given 
jobs within the Yemeni security services.76  
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As of June 2005, Yemeni officials declared that Yemen was 90% free of terrorists 
and advised they had released 364 rehabilitated detainees.77 Yemen supported the success 
of the program by indicating that some of the former detainees had cooperated with the 
Yemeni government by providing information leading to the capture of both hidden 
weapons caches, and also other radical Islamists. One example was the killing of a top 
Al-Qaeda commander in Yemen after a tip-off from a former detainee.78 Some reformed 
extremists have become government informants and others have become mediators 
between the government and the at-large extremists.79 
C. INDIVIDUAL DISENGAGEMENT FACTORS 
An obvious disengagement factor seen in the Yemeni program was the physical 
factor of imprisonment. The Yemeni government targeted not only those who had fought 
in Afghanistan but other Islamists who were deemed to hold “dangerous beliefs.”80 
However, one problem with this method is the potential for radicalization. Many program 
participants were arrested and detained without charges, which led to increased 
resentment towards the government.  
A major disengagement factor seen in the Yemen program was the changing of 
ideologies among many of the participants. The dialogue sessions also brought about an 
internal conflict within the group over ideologies and tactics. Some of the released 
detainees who had participated in the program began to speak and debate with others in 
an attempt to change their ideologies supporting violence and terrorism. 
The dialogue sessions with the committee changed the degree of insulation from 
larger society for many of the detainees. At the initial meeting, many of the detainees 
questioned the legitimacy of the ulema and of the Yemeni regime. Judge al-Hitar’s 
approach towards dialogue and his willingness to engage in frank debate did much to  
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establish legitimacy for the clerics involved in the program. Detainees also objected to 
certain government laws, policies and treaties. Judge al-Hitar provided copies of disputed 
documents and opened them up for debate.  
D. CRITICISMS OF PROGRAM 
One major criticism of the program is that many of the participants had been 
arrested and imprisoned due to suspicions of their involvement with extremists and many 
had not committed any crimes in Yemen or been charged with any offenses.81 A number 
of participants felt they had been imprisoned unjustly and forced to participate in 
dialogue to obtain their freedom.82 
A former participant in Yemen’s program disclosed that all the prisoners knew 
that Judge al-Hitar could secure their release, and therefore, they curried favor with 
him.83 Some of the released participants advised no real dialogue or exchange of ideas 
ever took place.84 Other former participants advised the program was not so much of a 
re-interpretation of Islamic ideology but more of a bargain between the extremists and the 
Yemeni government. As one former detainee advised, as long as the extremist did not 
conduct attacks within Yemen, they would be left alone.85  
Little effort was made in attempting to reintegrate released detainees back into 
society. The Yemen government did not provide social support to detainees and made 
minimal efforts to support detainees eventually released. Some participants were 
promised employment or other assistance upon release but then received nothing.86 The 
government also did not maintain any adequate surveillance of former prisoners’ 
activities. Prisoner passports were not confiscated and no provisions were made to 
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prevent them from traveling abroad.87 Yemen did not track recidivism rates among the 
released detainees and the government closely guarded the identities of released program 
participants.88  
Judge al-Hitar, the head of the dialogue committee, was also the focus of a 
number of criticisms. Although the Yemeni government claimed the committee was 
comprised of a number of “respected Islamic scholars,” Judge al-Hitar appeared to be the 
sole public representative of the committee and some allege that no other cleric took an 
active role in the dialogues due to differences of opinion with Judge al-Hitar.89 
Another criticism of Judge al-Hitar was his declaration that Yemeni participation 
in jihad within Iraq was legitimate.90 Judge al-Hitar, along with several other judges and 
clerics in Yemen, believe that according to sharia, jihad is permissible against occupiers 
of Muslim lands. A further controversy was his possible link to Al Qaeda. In February 
2006, twenty-three Al-Qaeda jihadists escaped from a Yemeni prison. The escape was 
made via a tunnel that went from the prison to the women’s section of a local mosque 
from which Judge al-Hitar preached. There was also evidence of assistance provided 
from the Political Security Office, Yemen’s internal security service. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
In December 2005, Yemen’s deradicalization program was deemed a failure due 
to high recidivism rates and the committee was shut down. Sources within the Yemeni 
government stated that the government felt the program was a failure due to the number 
of former detainees who returned to violence after their release.91 At least eight of the 
released prisoners left Yemen to fight in Iraq and a few have been implicated in suicide 
attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq.92 However, the presence of Yemeni fighters in Iraq 
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does not necessarily prove a failure of ideological-based deradicalization in Yemen. 
Judge al-Hitar and other Yemeni clerics did not dispute the legitimacy of jihad in Iraq. 
Yet, the reoccurring terrorist attacks within Yemen reflect its continued problem with 
Islamist extremists. 
Yemen was one of the first states to implement a program of debate and dialogue 
to change ideologies of imprisoned Islamist extremists. Although Yemen’s 
deradicalization program achieved limited success, Yemen’s program provided a 
significant change to the counter-terrorism efforts in many states. A number of other 
states have built on Yemen’s individual-focused approach and formed their own 
programs to counter extremism. Yemen recently re-implemented its deradicalization 
initiatives in mid-2008. However, the likelihood of its success is doubtful if the 
shortcomings of the previous program are not addressed. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: SAUDI ARABIA’S DERADICALIZATION 
PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, when al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) began conducting a 
campaign of bombings targeting Western companies within the Kingdom, Saudi’s 
security apparatus started an aggressive campaign to identify and arrest extremists in the 
Kingdom. These extremists eventually began targeting Saudi Arabia’s security apparatus 
in retaliation for their crackdown. Between 2003 and 2004, there were 61 violent 
confrontations between Saudi security forces and extremists.93 However, Saudi security 
forces have been successful in disrupting the terrorist organization as evidenced by the 
absence of any successful attacks since 2006.94  
There are a number of causes attributed to the rise of extremism and the incidents 
of terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia. The QAP attacks in the Kingdom are often seen 
as the result of sentiments of “extreme anti-westernism.”95 Extremism is also attributed to 
negative attitudes towards the Al-Saud regime, their policies, and also towards political 
repression. “Close ties to the United States, perceived corruption on the part of the ruling 
family, and an exclusionary political system make Saudi Arabia vulnerable to recurring 
patterns of radicalization.”96 Another factor contributing to extremism was the return of 
large numbers of radicalized Saudi jihadists from Afghanistan in 2002.97 A common 
thread among the radicals is their interpretation of Islam and their justifications for the 
use of violence against foreigners and the Saudi establishment. 
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To deal with these problems, the Saudi government has taken a multi-pronged 
approach to deradicalization. The approach currently being used within the prison system 
is to change the jihadist prisoners’ interpretations concerning the meaning of jihad and 
the concept of takfir, or declaring a person an infidel. In addition to the rehabilitation 
program aimed at imprisoned extremists, Saudi has instituted other programs to deal with 
radicalization within the Kingdom. Another approach being implemented is to counter 
the ideologies of extremists via the Internet. A third approach is to help reintegrate 
released prisoners back into normal society.  
B. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM 
The main approach to counter imprisoned extremists in the Kingdom consisted of 
a deradicalization-counseling program aimed at countering the religious ideologies held 
by the extremists. Saudi’s approach is similar to the recent approaches by a number of 
other countries in dealing with deradicalization of imprisoned extremists. However, the 
Saudi program is the most comprehensive and well-funded program of all the current 
deradicalization programs in existence.98 The program consists of religious re-education, 
psychological counseling for the participant and a reintegration process after release from 
prison. 
The Saudi program works on the presumption that extremist views are the result 
of a mistake in the interpretation of Islam.99 The program views the prisoner as having 
been led away from true Islam by extremists.100 Rather than punishing the prisoner, the 
Saudi program treats the prisoner as a misguided victim who can be redeemed through re-
education. The Saudi program also utilizes Saudi culture and traditions by using familial 
hierarchies and community ties to take responsibility for the program participant.101  
                                                 
98 Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, 
and Aftercare,” Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, no. 97 (2008): 23. 
99 Fink and Hearne, “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent 
Extremism,” 6. 
100 Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Re-education and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” in Leaving 
Terrorism Behind, ed. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2009), 215. 
101 Fink and Hearne, “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent 
Extremism,” 7. 
 29
The Saudi government does not utilize the program for all security prisoners. 
About 10% of Saudi’s security prisoners are deemed hardcore extremists.102 Many of 
these hardcore extremists refuse to participate in the program. The religious re-education 
program is targeted towards security prisoners who have not taken part in any violent acts 
against the Saudi government. Those who have committed terrorist acts can also take part 
in the program but are not eligible for release.103 Also, all Saudis repatriated from 
Guantanamo prison are required to participate in the program.104 The main objective of 
the program’s ideological approach is to counter the extremist ideology of takfir through 
intensive religious dialogue and psychological counseling.105  
A group within the Saudi Ministry of Interior known as the Advisory Committee 
is responsible for administrating the deradicalization program. The Advisory Committee 
is composed of four smaller sub-committees: the Religious Subcommittee, the 
Psychological and Social Subcommittee, the Security Subcommittee and the Media 
Subcommittee.106 Each subcommittee plays an integral role in the deradicalization and 
rehabilitation of security prisoners. 
The Religious Subcommittee provides counseling through approximately 150 
clerics and scholars who engage in dialogue and debate with prisoners.107 The program is 
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able to use the most appropriate methods to facilitate communication with the 
prisoners.108 A primary factor in selecting clerics is based on their communication ability 
and whether it is conducive to dialogue.109  
The Psychological and Social Subcommittee is also involved in the counseling 
process. This subcommittee is comprised of approximately 50 mental health specialists 
and social scientists responsible for assessing and diagnosing prisoner psychological 
problems and behavior.110 Another function of this group is to evaluate whether the 
participant is sincere in his desire for rehabilitation. This group also evaluates prisoners’ 
families to determine what support they need.111  
The Security Subcommittee evaluates potential security risks among the 
participants and makes recommendations on their release.112 This subcommittee also 
monitors participants after their release. Released participants are required to check in 
with the Security Subcommittee on a regular basis.113 
The fourth component, the Media Subcommittee, produces the educational 
materials used in the counseling sessions and religious classes for prisoners. This 
subcommittee also produces other materials to be used in Saudi schools and mosques.114 
The Media Subcommittee also functions as an outreach and education program targeting 
young Saudi males who may be exposed to radical viewpoints.115 The main purpose of 
this subcommittee is to generate and reinforce the message against terrorism and 
extremist thought. 
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The counseling process begins with initial one-on-one meetings between the 
prisoner and an Advisory Committee cleric. In the initial meeting between the prisoner 
and the Advisory Committee cleric, the cleric clarifies that he is “an independent and 
righteous scholar” and not an employee of the Saudi security forces.116 The main 
objective of the first meeting is for the cleric to engage the prisoner in conversation about 
the prisoner’s actions that brought him to prison and what his religious justifications 
were.117 This initial conversation opens the door for further dialogue on religion and the 
prisoner’s understandings of Islam. The cleric explains to the prisoner why his 
justifications were wrong and then teaches the state-approved religious interpretation of 
his actions.118 
Radical ideologies can only successfully be countered by someone who not only 
is knowledgeable about Islam but can also garner the respect of the extremist. The 
opinions of the ulema, or recognized Islamic scholars, carry more weight and can be 
successful in countering extremist ideologies. “Muslims…are more comfortable with 
theological and juristic interpretations of religious questions.”119 A benefit of Saudi 
Arabia is that it has a vast number of Islamic scholars who can be utilized in the program.  
After individual sessions, the program runs a series of short dialogue sessions 
lasting one to two hours that take place in both formal classroom sessions, and also in 
more informal settings.120 After short sessions, the program has longer dialogue sessions 
consisting of six-week courses in which specific topics, such as takfir, jihad and terrorism 
are discussed.121 After each course, an examination is given. The prisoner must pass the 
exam or retake the course.  
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After completion of the counseling and dialogue sessions, the prisoner is 
evaluated for release. If approved, the prisoner is released from prison and put into the 
next phase of the rehabilitation program. After release from prison, the returnees are 
housed at a halfway house, the Care Rehabilitation Center in a Riyadh suburb for further 
counseling and reintegration back into society. 
Released prisoners typically spend 8 to 12 weeks in the halfway house and are 
restricted to the facility unless they are in the custody of their families. The Guantanamo 
returnees are given more psychological counseling than other residents are and the focus 
of their treatment is to help them adjust to freedom and reintegration back into society.122 
Participants are monitored after release and are required to check in regularly with the 
program officials.  
The ability to segregate extremists from the general population is important in 
preventing radicalization. Saudi Arabia has addressed prison concerns by building five 
new prisons specifically to support their deradicalization programs. Each prison is 
designed to accommodate the program needs. Each prison also can hold approximately 
1,200 prisoners.  
Unlike typical Saudi prisons where large groups of individuals are housed 
together in large cells, the new prisons allow for segregation of individuals. Saudi 
officials are careful not to house common criminals in the same locations as extremists to 
prevent radicalization of the former.123 The new prisons contain individual self-contained 
cells equipped with televisions, which can be used to transmit selected programs and 
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guards, and also to prevent communication among the individual prisoners.125 All cells 
and interrogation rooms are equipped with cameras, which serve the purpose of 
preventing abuse against prisoners.126 
The new Saudi prison design is also accommodating for prisoner families. Family 
participation is a vital part of the rehabilitation process. The new prisons include 
designated locations to allow for visitation with family members. Married prisoners are 
also allowed conjugal visits with their spouses in rooms set aside for the purpose.127  
C. RADICALIZATION VIA THE INTERNET 
Saudi officials have also targeted Internet Web sites, which advocate extremist 
ideologies. The Internet has been “one of the most important resources used by Al Qaeda 
and other extremist groups to spread deviant ideologies like the takfir and jihad doctrines 
to Saudi youth.”128 In addition, Internet-based technology enables jihadists to “share their 
skills and training much more easily” with other jihadists.129 
The Al-Sakinah Campaign is an attempt by the Saudi government to counter 
religious extremist ideologies online by using volunteer members of the Saudi ulema to 
start an online dialogue with Islamists on extremist Web sites. The al-Sakinah Campaign 
consists of more than 66 volunteers comprised of academics, religious scholars, 
psychiatrists and sociologists who use the Internet to contact radicals.130 According to a 
July 2005 interview with the director of the campaign, the group found 130 active Web 
sites that spread the takfir ideology.131 The clerics infiltrated these Web sites and began 
dialogues with others on the Web sites. The clerics target Saudis online who support 
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violent ideologies but have not participated in any terrorist acts.132 A January 2006 report 
indicated that ulama had conducted dialogue with 972 individuals for a total of 53,760 
hours to get them to renounce their extremist beliefs.133 Although it is difficult to 
measure success rates of this campaign, Saudi newspapers reported that several high-
ranking Al-Qaeda members renounced their extremist views after dialogue with the 
clerics.134 Also of interest is that Al-Qaeda has issued several statements warning its 
followers against engaging in dialogue with the Sakinah members, and has also made 
numerous attempts to hack into and attack the Sakinah’s computer systems.135  
D. DISENGAGEMENT FACTORS 
The multi-pronged approach to deradicalization seen in Saudi Arabia contains a 
significant number of factors that assist in the disengagement and potential 
deradicalization of extremists. Physical factors include apprehension, detainment and, 
most important, segregation of extremists in facilities designed to accommodate the 
rehabilitation process. The approach of the Saudi program is fair and positive towards the 
prisoners.  
One key factor involved in moving from violence to peace was the personal 
relationships of the extremist in which their behavior changed after influence of a mentor 
or friend who supports peaceful behavior.136 For this reason, program clerics and doctors 
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release.137 According to Saudi government officials, the recidivism rates of released 
security prisoners are only 1–2% or 35 people of approximately 1,400 prisoners who 
have been released after participation in the program.138  
The inclusion of family members in the rehabilitation of each participant serves 
not only to strengthen ties with normal society but also solidifies social bonds, which 
provide external support to the participant. The Saudi program is significant in that it 
works within Saudi culture by recognizing and utilizing the importance of family in its 
approach to deradicalization and rehabilitation. The family of the prisoner is actively 
involved in the deradicalization process. In addition, by providing significant support to a 
prisoner’s family, the Saudi government creates an atmosphere of goodwill and creates a 
sense of commitment from the recipient to the government. 
The Saudi program is significant in that the rehabilitation effort extensively 
involves the prisoners’ families and this involvement is critical to the success of the 
rehabilitation and reintegration process.139 The Saudi program realizes that by increasing 
an individual’s commitment to his family, the commitment to the extremist group is 
lessened. Saudi’s rehabilitation and reintegration includes programs to facilitate 
marriages, education and training programs, and financial support to families for 
necessities.140 Upon completion of the program, former jihadists must sign a pledge 
renouncing extremist views. The head of the family must also sign. After completion, 
former prisoners are also given assistance in finding jobs, housing and planning marriage. 
Saudi authorities feel that marriage offers a stabilizing future for former jihadists who 
would be less likely to engage in subversive activities if they have a wife and children at 
home. Financial assistance to the families is crucial in that it deters potential  
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radicalization of these members due to financial hardships suffered when the breadwinner 
is detained.141 The Saudi government is also very clear that it will hold the extended 
family responsible for any recidivism of the released detainee.  
The Saudi program also addresses the prisoner’s social needs by including 
families in its efforts and providing monetary support, which encourages goodwill 
towards the government, and also prevents radical groups from stepping in to influence 
families.142 Monetary support is often provided in the way of stipends to support the 
family while the breadwinner is incarcerated.143 The government also provides for 
education and healthcare needs of the families. Research has shown that spouses and 
families can often be a significant factor in the disengagement of violent activism.144 
However, a major criticism of the Saudi program is that the extremists’ views have not 
been changed but they have renounced them not due to an actual change in beliefs but 
due to the financial incentives given to their families. 
E. CRITICISMS 
An examination of deradicalization programs in Saudi Arabia shows that there 
has been some success with the use of certain methods. The examination also highlights 
some of the detriments to success of the programs. The basis of the deradicalization 
program is that Islamist extremists do not have a proper understanding of Islam. 
However, an examination of Saudi’s education system shows the prevalence of religious 
curricula throughout all phases of education. This suggests that current religious curricula 
may be a significant contributor towards this “misunderstanding.” Reform of the 
educational curricula may help to counter radical ideologies. 
The recidivism rates within the program, although relatively low, indicate a 
possible need to address the current monitoring of participants after their release. Saudi 
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authorities claim an 80 to 90% success rate with their program.145 However, the relative 
newness of the program makes it difficult to track recidivism rates and the Saudi 
government often does not release data on re-offenders. Saudi officials did advise that 
approximately 11 Saudis who went through the rehabilitation program after their release 
from Guantanamo have returned to terrorism.146 One former participant, Said Ali al-
Shihri, is suspected of involvement in the 2008 terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in 
Sana’a, Yemen.147 Another former participant, Abu Hareth Muhammad al-Awfi, also 
rejoined a terrorist group in Yemen but then returned to Saudi Arabia and turned himself 
in to authorities. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Saudi Arabia with its multi-pronged and comprehensive approach shows the most 
promise of all the deradicalization programs. If Saudi Arabia is able to succeed with its 
program, these methods can be incorporated into numerous other countries’ programs and 
possibly alleviate the growing threat from Muslim extremists. Saudi Arabia’s programs 
have many advantages due to the amount of resources that Saudi is able to dedicate to the 
program. Mainly, Saudi Arabia has access to a significant amount of rentier income and 
is able to dedicate a large amount of money to the success of the program. In addition, 
Saudi clerics hold an authority enhanced by Saudi Arabia’s claim to guardianship of the 
two holy cities in Islam. Saudi’s vast resources, both monetary and religious, allow for 
program components that are difficult to replicate in other locations. 
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V. CASE STUDY: INDONESIA’S DERADICALIZATION 
PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia is Southeast Asia’s largest nation and the world’s largest Muslim 
country with a population of approximately 237.5 million. Approximately 90% of 
Indonesia’s population is Muslim although Islamic practices in the nation vary 
throughout.148 Indonesia’s political landscape and constitution are based on a pluralistic 
and secular foundation although moderate Islamist groups have achieved political 
representation.149 In recent years, there has been an outgrowth of Islamic orthodoxy due 
to the prevalence of Salafi-based religious schools.150 Since the mid-1990s, a number of 
radicalized and violent groups have emerged within Indonesia.  
In late 2001, Singapore and Malaysia arrested a number of terrorists from an 
extremist group called Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Both countries pointed out that JI had a 
much larger network within Indonesia. However, Indonesian authorities did not begin to 
target JI members until JI began conducting attacks within Indonesia against Westerners. 
In 2002, JI members executed bombings in the popular tourist areas in Bali killing 202 
people. JI was suspected of being responsible for the 2003 bombing of the JW Marriott 
Hotel in Jakarta and the 2004 bombing outside of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. In 
2005, JI was again suspected of suicide bombings in Bali, which took place near popular 
tourist locations and killed 20 people. These attacks had a significant impact on 
Indonesia’s economy and greatly damaged the tourism industry.  
Indonesia has been slow to recognize the problem of radicalized Islamists. The 
view of many or most Indonesians is that the global war on terror is really a war against 
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Muslims and many Indonesians do not see Islamist extremists as a threat.151 In addition, 
the Indonesian government has been guarded about confronting radicalized Islamic 
groups due to concerns of alienating the mainstream Muslims who often view these 
groups as just another part of the greater Islamic community.152 
Indonesia has captured more than 300 militants since the Bali bombings in 
2002.153 After these arrests, Indonesia changed tactics in how they handle militants. 
Indonesia has taken a two-pronged approach to countering radical jihadists. One 
approach has been to identify and imprison jihadists responsible for terrorist attacks 
aggressively. The second approach involves changing jihadist attitudes through 
deradicalization programs, and also by locating and replacing Islamist preachers and 
teachers with professionals possessing more moderate views.154  
Indonesia’s attempt at deradicalization consists of a makeshift program geared 
towards changing the ideologies of captured jihadists. The program is run by different 
individuals and organizations all relying upon limited resources. Yet, despite the program 
being understaffed and underfinanced, Indonesia has claimed some degree of success. 
This chapter examines Indonesia’s deradicalization program to see how effective their 
approach has been. What are the key components of Indonesia’s deradicalization program 
and how do they compare with disengagement factors?  
B. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM 
Indonesia’s government initially began attempts to counter Islamist radicalism 
through Islamic scholars in 2005. The Indonesian Vice-President brought together a  
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group of Muslim scholars to counter jihadist teachings.155 However, the effort failed due 
to many in the group not seeing the necessity of the project and other members of the 
group having no knowledge of what the jihadist teachings covered.156  
In 2005, Indonesian police decided to implement their own program in their 
counterterrorism efforts against JI. The police began an ad hoc deradicalization program 
aimed at imprisoned terrorists. The program was initially started with the aim of 
identifying and targeting prisoners who could be persuaded to provide intelligence 
information against other jihadists.157 Police also attempted to recruit those jihadists 
opposed to using violence against civilians to use them to influence the violent jihadists. 
Nick O’Brien, a British counterterrorism expert, stated the Indonesian program is able to 
exploit Jemaah Islamiyah based on the internal split within the group of those that have 
adopted violent tactics against Western targets and others who oppose this tactic.158  
Many jihadists have a distrust of police due to violent retribution from previous 
rebellions.159 Indonesia’s new approach is to provide humane treatment and show respect 
for the detainee’s Islamic practices.160 The approach is helped by the fact that most of the 
police are Muslim. Maintaining Islamic values has enhanced the reputation of the police 
who manage the rehabilitation program. In addition, former jihadists who assist with the 
rehabilitation program often spend up to a week with new detainees before police 
interrogators are given access to them.161 Most of Indonesia’s police counterterrorism 
unit leaders are devout Muslims who will stop interrogation sessions to pray.162 These 
demonstrations of piety do much to curb distrust. 
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The Indonesia program approaches each terrorist on an individual level. In 
addition to counseling, the Indonesia program provides educational opportunities to the 
detained terrorist and provides financial support to the families of imprisoned 
terrorists.163 Police provide financial assistance to jihadist families to pay for food, 
clothing and education requirements. Families are also given more opportunities to visit 
with the imprisoned jihadist.  
The program has two main assumptions: that jihadists only listen to other jihadists 
and that jihadist perception of police can be changed through kind treatment.164 Indonesia 
does not utilize religious scholars to counsel detainees, as they believe the detainees do 
not find the scholars to be credible. The program instead relies on reformed jihadists to 
talk to prisoners in a belief that radicals are able to relate to these former radicals.165 Of 
significance, the reformed jihadists used in the program were senior leaders in JI, which 
is helpful in the Indonesian hierarchical culture that tends to be deferential to authority 
figures.166 
Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron are two Indonesian jihadists who took part in the 
Afghanistan fight against Russian occupation. Both are former JI leaders who participate 
in the deradicalization program by approaching JI prisoners and challenging their 
beliefs.167 The key differences between these two jihadists are that Abbas never took part 
in any attacks targeting civilians whereas Imron was a participant in a number of terrorist 
attacks to include the 2002 Bali bombings. The two main issues that Abbas focuses on 
are the targeting of civilians and the need for creating an Islamic state.168 In contrast, 
Imron agrees with the bombers’ interpretation of jihad but disagrees with the timing of 
“waging war without adequate preparation.”169  
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C. DISENGAGEMENT FACTORS 
How have Indonesian police succeeded in getting jihadists to disengage from their 
group? In the case of Imron and Abbas, a number of factors laid the foundation for both 
jihadists to disengage and deradicalize. Factors include the removal of both from the 
influence of JI, the immediate “intervention” upon being detained, the positive treatment 
received from police, and the ideological differences between both men and other JI 
leaders. 
The most obvious disengagement factors seen within Indonesia’s deradicalization 
program are the physical factors of apprehension and imprisonment by Indonesian 
security forces. Upon apprehension, the extremist is cut off from JI. Imprisoned JI leaders 
are often kept at police headquarters to prevent contact with other JI prisoners.170 In 
addition, these prisoners receive fair treatment from police, which negates the JI 
argument that government forces are abusive towards Muslims.171 
A psychological factor often seen in disengagement is that of disillusion or 
ideological conflict. Disillusion can have a large influence on an individual’s role change 
in an organization from an active participant to a less active role.172 A loss of faith in the 
ideology of a group or the feelings that the violence has escalated too far can be a 
negative social force causing an individual to disengage.173 Abbas, a former JI leader, 
stated an ideological debate within JI emerged in 1998 with some members wanting to 
“take the war to the civilians” and others disagreeing with the targeting of civilians.”174 
This disagreement in ideology has brought about the disengagement of a number of 
extremists who feel that the terrorist attacks targeting civilians has brought more harm 
than good to the Muslim community.175 Prior to beginning interrogations, police often 
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allow the reformed extremists to spend several days with the detainees debating 
ideologies. Police found interrogations to be easier after ideological arguments were 
resolved.176 
One strong point within the Indonesian program has been the ability of the police 
to identify and obtain the cooperation of senior JI leaders. Nasir Abbas was a high profile 
senior JI leader who set up the organization of JI in Philippines and had also trained and 
fought in Afghanistan.177 Ali Imron, who had also fought in Afghanistan, had a strong 
religious background and “could hold his own on points of Islamic law with JI’s best 
scholars.”178 As seen in both Egypt and Algeria, leaders of terrorist groups can have a 
significant influence on encouraging others within the group to disengage and 
deradicalize. Indonesian police have realized this and target JI leaders in the hope that “if 
a leader changed his mind, others would follow.”179 
D. CRITICISMS OF PROGRAM 
There are some weaknesses in the tactics and methodology of the Indonesian 
deradicalization program. Although former jihadists may be able to appear credible to 
imprisoned terrorists, they are quickly discredited by their cooperation with police. 
Imron’s public sightings in the company of police officials and his comfortable lifestyle 
has been highlighted by the Indonesian media and contributed to his loss of credibility 
among many JI members.180  
Another criticism is that the Indonesian prison system undermines the 
rehabilitation efforts. Indonesia prisons are rife with corruption and overcrowding. Prison 
populations have their own hierarchy and cell leaders routinely extort money from other 
prisoners in the cell.181 Prisoners must pay for basic necessities,, such as food, housing 
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and visiting privileges. Indonesia’s prisons are rife with gangs and imprisoned jihadists 
often band together to protect themselves from these gangs. Attempts are made to 
segregate jihadists from the rest of the prison population; however, no attempts are made 
to separate the hardcore extremists from the jihadists that are more likely to be influenced 
by the deradicalization program.182 Indonesia’s deradicalization program is often 
undermined as soon as the jihadist enters prison. Schulze points out that Indonesian 
police are aware of this, and therefore, try to keep many prisoners at police headquarters 
rather than place them in the prison system.183  
The program is only targeted towards some jihadists in custody and there is no 
structured rehabilitation program for them once they are released from police custody.184 
Also, after release, many “rehabilitated” jihadists are placed right back in their pre-
incarceration environments, which make them more likely to fall back in with other 
jihadists.  
Although the Indonesian police attempt to address jihadists’ needs, the aid is not 
evenly distributed among the prisoners; some receive much more benefits than others 
do.185 One senior police official stressed that he felt the socio-economic approach was 
more effective in rehabilitating jihadists than an ideological approach.186 Yet, only some 
imprisoned jihadists receive any economic assistance while others are ignored. 
As a whole, Indonesian police see the deradicalization program as successful and 
base this assumption on the decrease in bombings since 2005. The program has also led 
to increased intelligence information, which has allowed them to apprehend high-level JI 
members.187 The perceived success of the program was recognized by the Indonesian 
parliament in February 2007 when they decided to back the program officially.188 Yet, 
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the program is still “woefully under resourced.”189 A further issue is that prison sentences 
are relatively short in Indonesia, so there is little incentive to participate in the 
program.190 Without adequate funding and resources, the program is likely to continue to 
have limited success only. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
An examination of the deradicalization program in Indonesia shows that there has 
been some success with the use of certain methods. The examination also highlights some 
of the detriments to success of the program. For Indonesia’s deradicalization program to 
be viable, it must address certain elements: reform within the prison structure, 
institutional support to the program, social support to detainees’ families, and 
implementation of aftercare programs. 
As the numbers of jihadist prisoners increases, the available resources to deal with 
them in the prison environment are strained.191 The ability to segregate extremists from 
the general population is important in preventing radicalization. Further, corruption 
within the prison system can derail any attempts at deradicalization. The deradicalization 
program in Indonesia will likely not be viable unless a broader program of prison reform 
is instituted. 
Official support by government is vital to the success of a program. While 
Indonesia’s parliament has recently begun public support of the deradicalization program, 
the program is still woefully underfunded and understaffed. Without more government 
support, Indonesia’s deradicalization program is likely only to have limited success. 
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Research has shown that spouses and families can often be a significant factor in 
the disengagement of violent activism.192 In 2007, of the 400 jihadists and family 
members offered counseling in disengagement, only 20 participated.193 Although 
Indonesia has slowly begun to focus on the families of imprisoned jihadists, JI provides 
much of the support to these families.194 
Prisoners need to be re-integrated into normal society. Monitoring prisoners after 
their release is crucial to prevent recidivism. Indonesia has no parole system and lacks 
resources to monitor former prisoners adequately. It is difficult to ensure completely that 
the program participant is actually reformed or whether he is simply practicing the jihad 
principle of takeyya in which disinformation and deception are justified if their well-
being or Islam is threatened.195 In addition, JI prisoners are often released early through 
general amnesties. 
Indonesia has been able to initiate a somewhat successful deradicalization 
program despite lack of funding, overcrowded prisons, and lack of other resources. This 
success is evidenced most strongly by the public recantations and rejection of violence by 
a number of JI leaders. In addition, the growing support given to the program by 
Indonesia’s government is helpful in strengthening the program. 
Indonesia’s deradicalization program may not be viable in the long run due to a 
number of weaknesses within the program. Unless Indonesia is prepared to formulate 
reforms within the prison system, it is likely that the deradicalization program only is 
able to be implemented towards a small minority of incarcerated extremists. Currently, a 
number of extremists are released from prison without any attempts being made to 
deradicalize them. In addition, Indonesia lacks any formal after-care programs, which 
increase the likelihood of recidivism. 
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VI. CASE STUDY: SINGAPORE’S DERADICALIZATION 
EFFORTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Singapore is another country, which has developed a comprehensive 
deradicalization program for imprisoned extremists. Singapore’s deradicalization 
program is significant in that it is one of the first programs to target Islamist extremists in 
a country with a minority Muslim population. The results of Singapore’s program could 
prove a model in the development of Islamist deradicalization programs in other non-
Muslim majority countries. 
To date, Singapore has not suffered any major acts of terrorism like those seen in 
Europe, the United States and Indonesia. However, Singapore has foiled several plans for 
terrorism within its borders. In late 2001, Singapore security services disrupted a terrorist 
plot by members of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) who were targeting several locations throughout 
Singapore. JI membership in Singapore was estimated to be between 60 and 80 
members.196 Singapore authorities were unaware of the existence of JI inside Singapore 
until they received information from a member of the Muslim community about the 
suspected involvement of a Singaporean national with al-Qaeda. Singapore maintains a 
strong counterterrorism stance. Under Singapore’s Internal Security Act, preventative 
detention is authorized for anyone suspected of being a threat to the national security of 
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terrorism.198 Since September 2008, only 23 detainees remain imprisoned and 41 have 
been released under some type of supervision.199 A few others have been released 
without conditions. 
The imprisonment of a number of JI members led Singapore to implement a 
rehabilitation ideological-based program to attempt to deradicalize these detainees. 
Singapore based its program after the Yemen initiatives. The core function of 
Singapore’s program is also to counter the extremist ideologies held by imprisoned 
terrorists. Singapore uses moderate Islamic scholars to engage in debate and counseling 
with prisoners. The Singapore government also works with Muslim organizations in the 
community to provide monetary assistance to prisoners’ families.200 In addition, the 
Singapore government has taken several steps to prevent alienation of the Muslim 
community in Singapore by keeping Muslim community leaders informed of the arrests 
and criminal investigations on Muslim extremists.201 Singapore has also taken additional 
efforts to counter radical ideologies within Singapore’s Muslim communities by 
obtaining the support of its Muslim community, licensing Islamic teachers, and 
promoting moderate Islam within the state.  
B. OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM 
In 2002, the Singapore security service invited two local well-respected Islamic 
leaders to speak with the detainees. The two Muslim leaders became concerned with the 
radical ideologies espoused by the detainees. As a result, the government formed the 
Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) to provide religious counseling to detainees. The 
RRG consists of three sub-groups. The first group, Secretariat Group, was composed of 
six volunteers from various Islamic groups who handled administrative duties for RRG 
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and prepared materials to counter the radical ideologies of the JI detainees.202 The second 
group was the Resource Panel, which was comprised of a judge, a government Islamic 
scholar, and three independent Islamic scholars whose duties were to evaluate the 
materials prepared by the Secretariat Group.203 The third group, the Rehabilitation 
Counselors Panel, consisted of approximately 20 volunteer religious counselors who 
provided counseling to detainees, former detainees and detainee families.204 
The RRG was composed of volunteer Islamic scholars and teachers to provide 
counseling to and engage in debate with the detainees to counter their ideologies. 
Volunteers consisted of both males and females of varying ages but all had experience in 
teaching Islam and many had graduated from prominent Islamic universities in Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Malaysia.205 Each volunteer focused solely on religious counseling 
although each did collaborate with a security case officer and a government psychologist 
for each detainee undergoing counseling.206 The program started with 20 religious 
volunteers but has since doubled in size.207 
The RRG also made efforts to standardize the methods of counseling. All 
volunteer counselors attended briefings and training sessions with government 
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Psychology.”209 In addition, the RRG trained each counselor in the use of the RRG-
written deradicalization manual.210 RRG has also held retreats for the volunteers for them 
to share experiences and collaboration on the rehabilitation process.211 
RRG counselors found that the majority of the detainees were not very 
knowledgeable in the fundamental beliefs and jurisprudence of Islam.212 Most had 
encountered JI members through their efforts to learn more about Islam and seek out 
religious teachers. This often led to their radicalization due to the exposure to the 
teachings of Singapore JI leaders. The main Islamic concepts leading to their 
radicalization were the beliefs that jihad must be conducted to restore the Islamic 
Caliphate and that jihad was a compulsory duty for all Muslims.213 
Re-education is conducted in four phases. In the first phase of the program, the 
counselor identifies the detainee’s ideologies and misunderstanding of certain Islamic 
concepts.214 The second phase begins with the counselor refuting any incorrect beliefs.215 
Third, the counselor replaces any misunderstandings with a correct interpretation of the 
concept.216 Lastly, the counselor teaches the detainee the correct Islamic knowledge.217 
RRG focuses on five specific areas: aspects of extremism, misinterpretation of 
certain Islamic concepts, the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims, concepts 
of jihad and sharia, and the anti-Western viewpoints of the detainees.218 In 2003, the 
RRG also embarked on a project to write a deradicalization manual. They utilized  
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information gleaned from investigations by the Ministry of Home Affairs, as well as 
information from interviews between religious counselors and detainees.219 In addition, a 
former JI detainee also provided feedback on the material gathered.220 
From 2004 to 2006, RRG counselors conducted more than 500 counseling 
sessions with the JI detainees.221 Dialogue sessions with JI leaders were not productive; 
however, sessions with the average members were relatively fruitful. Most of the 
detainees had not engaged in actual terrorism and had been in support roles within JI.222 
The average age of the detainees was 39 and most were employed and married with 
families.223 Singapore releases extremists believed to be rehabilitated but imposes a 
number of restrictions upon them while continuing close monitoring of their activities.  
Singapore officials also focused on support to the families of detainees. In 2005, 
the Singapore government formed an organization to aid detainees’ families. This 
organization, Interagency-After Care Group (ACG), provided financial assistance to 
families, assisted family members with finding employment, and provided opportunities 
for the education of detainees’ children. Female counselors were sent to interact with 
female family members of the detainees. Most of the families had relied exclusively on 
the detainee spouse for financial support.  
The initial arrests of a number of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members in Singapore led 
many within the minority Muslim community to suspect a possible conspiracy against 
Muslims by the government. The Singapore government was aware of the potential 
problems that could arise from this and made significant effort to maintain and improve 
ties between the government and Muslim community leaders. The government kept  
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community leaders informed of any significant developments with the terrorism 
investigations. For example, the government briefed community leaders of arrests before 
they were disclosed to the public.224  
The Singapore government has also worked to improve ties between Muslims and 
non-Muslims in Singaporean society. The Islamic Religious Council (MUIS) 
collaborated with community Muslim associations to certify and register religious 
teachers within Singapore to ensure that moderate, balanced instruction occurred. MUIS 
also established the Harmony Centre, a type of museum for Islamic civilization. The aim 
of the centre is to promote understandings of the major religions to counter prejudices 
between Muslim and non-Muslim Singaporeans.225 
The Muslim communities within Singapore have also played an active role in 
combating extremism. Pergas, an association of Islamic scholars in Singapore, took a 
number of initiatives to counter extremist ideologies. In 2003, Pergas organized a 
convention of Islamic scholars to discuss extremism and advance moderate 
viewpoints.226 In addition, Pergas published a book countering specific ideologies 
employed by al-Qaeda and JI. 
The Singapore government and the Muslim community groups also recognize the 
problem of radicalization through the Internet. To address this problem, a number of 
organizations and individuals have developed their own Web sites to counter extremism 
and promote moderation. The RRG maintains a comprehensive Web site that provides 
information on countering extremist ideologies, and also provides information on its 
deradicalization program. A number of individuals also maintain blogs to counter 
extremist ideologies. 
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C. INDIVIDUAL DISENGAGEMENT FACTORS 
A major disengagement factor for Singaporean extremists has been 
disengagement through arrest and imprisonment. Singapore’s robust security services 
coupled with Singapore’s Internal Security Act have allowed the detainment of anyone 
suspected of terrorism. This has enabled Singapore authorities to disrupt any operational 
capabilities of JI and weaken the group as a whole. Arrest and imprisonment can also 
serve as a mechanism to cause an individual to break from the group.  
The Singapore government made several efforts to prevent radicalization within 
the Muslim communities inside Singapore. The government kept lines of communication 
open with Muslim community leaders. The leaders were kept informed of arrests of JI 
members.227 In addition, the government held meetings with non-Muslim communities to 
encourage them to “maintain social harmony.”228 The government and Muslim 
community leaders made it clear to the public that a “fringe group” who were not 
representative of the Muslim community within Singapore planned the terrorist plots.229 
Of significance is that most of the detainees had not been actively involved in acts 
of terrorism but had been in support roles instead.230 This decreased degree of 
involvement can serve to lessen commitment to the group. Most of the detainees were 
older than average and had established families. These factors alone provided alternate 
and likely competing commitments against loyalty to the group. 
The support provided to the families of detainees appears to be another important 
factor in the deradicalization process. This support highlighted the benevolence of the 
Singaporean government, and also prevented the likelihood of further radicalization due  
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to deprivations suffered from the loss of the family patriarch. Like other states, Singapore 
has realized the importance of family in the disengagement and deradicalization 
processes, and therefore, provides support to these family members. 
D. CRITICISMS OF THE PROGRAM 
One major criticism of Singapore’s program is on the legitimacy of the Islamic 
scholars in the deradicalization program. A major perception is that the Islamic scholars 
involved in the program are overwhelmingly Sufi and that the program is shaped by the 
context of Sufism. This perception was strengthened after an interview with one 
participant scholar was published and the scholar criticized Salafism and Wahabism as 
having radical viewpoints.231 In addition, the RRG Islamic scholars’ close involvement 
with the non-Muslim government has led some to argue that they are co-opted by an 
apostate regime.232 
In addition, unlike similar programs in other states, Singapore does not make use 
of reformed detainees to provide any counseling to detainees. Former group members, 
particularly former leaders, can be influential in changing the ideologies of other 
members. States, such as Indonesia and Egypt have utilized former detainees and found 
much success with this. It is not known how successful the RRG has been in changing the 
ideologies of the detainees. Released detainees may have been deterred due to ongoing 
surveillance by security services or the thought of further imprisonment.233 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Singapore appears to have been successful in the rehabilitation or deradicalization 
of several of its extremist detainees. Approximately 60 percent of the detainees have been  
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released from prison although some of them are under conditional or supervised 
release.234 However, the lack of recidivism could also be due to the close monitoring of 
former detainees by security services. 
Another advantage for the Singapore program is the ability of the government to 
draw on vast financial resources to implement program objectives. Unlike Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Singapore has only a small number of imprisoned extremists, 
and is therefore, more able to segregate these individuals within prisons, and also provide 
various counseling to detainees and provide extensive support to families of detainees. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Horgan proposed that any approach used to promote disengagement must be 
“tailor-made to not only the specific movement in question, but also perhaps to the 
specific role or individual being targeted by the security services.”235 The 
deradicalization programs in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Indonesia are all 
targeted towards individuals who have taken part in terrorist organizations that espouse 
an extremist religious ideology. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Singapore and Indonesia have all 
embarked on a multipronged approach to countering radical extremists. One approach has 
been to aggressively identify and imprison jihadists responsible for terrorist attacks. The 
second approach involves changing jihadist attitudes using Islamists and religious 
scholars possessing more moderate views.236 All four programs approach each terrorist 
on an individual level. The programs are also similar in that the participants have already 
physically disengaged from the extremist organizations due to imprisonment by security 
services. The programs vary in a number of ways also. Each country has a vastly 
different pool of resources to use towards the program. Each country also differs in the 
treatment of former participants upon their release from prison. 
Each program reflects a number of similar disengagement factors. All programs 
are prison-based so the participants have been physically disengaged from the extremist 
groups. Each program changes the degree of insulation of each individual to society by 
having the individual engage in dialogue with an outsider. The establishment of intimate 
bonds outside the extremist group can lead many extremists to disengage from the group. 
The Saudi program takes advantage of this in their approach through their inclusion of 
family and community in the deradicalization process. Some of the other programs also 
try to strengthen bonds between the participant and his family. Many of the programs 
provide positive features, such as monetary support to families. This serves to build a 
bond between the individual and the state rather than the extremist group. 
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Yemen’s program consisted mainly of ideological debate between clerics and 
detainees. The main goals of the dialogue appear to be proving the legitimacy of the 
Yemeni regime and discouraging violence within Yemen. This seems to have met with 
limited success. Yemen’s program suffers from limited resources. Families of prisoners 
are in a marginal role. Not much effort is based on any after-care for released 
participants. 
The Indonesia program provides religious counseling and debate led by former 
members of the terrorist organization, Jama’ah al Islamiyyah. In addition to counseling, 
the Indonesia program provides educational opportunities to the detained terrorist and 
provides financial support to the families of imprisoned terrorists.237 Police provide 
financial assistance to jihadist families to pay for food, clothing and education 
requirements. Families are also given more opportunities to visit with the imprisoned 
jihadist.  
The core function of Singapore’s program is also to counter the extremist 
ideologies held by imprisoned terrorists. Singapore uses moderate Islamic scholars to 
engage in debate and counseling with prisoners. The Singapore government also works 
with Muslim organizations in the community to provide monetary assistance to prisoners’ 
families.238 In addition, the Singapore government has taken several steps to prevent 
alienation of the Muslim community in Singapore by keeping Muslim community leaders 
informed of the arrests and criminal investigations on Muslim extremists.239 
The Saudi program is the most comprehensive and well-funded program of all the 
current deradicalization programs in existence.240 The program consists of religious re-
education, psychological counseling for the participant and a reintegration process after 
release from prison. The Saudi program also utilizes Saudi culture and traditions by using 
familial hierarchies and community ties to take responsibility also for the program 
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participant.241 The main objective of the program’s ideological approach is to counter the 
extremist ideology of takfir through intensive religious dialogue and psychological 
counseling.242  
Each of the four countries takes a different approach in their release of 
rehabilitated jihadists. Singapore releases extremists believed to be rehabilitated but 
imposes a number of restrictions upon them while continuing close monitoring of their 
activities. In Indonesia, the program is only targeted towards jihadists in custody and 
there is no structured rehabilitation program for them once they are released from police 
custody.243 In addition, many “rehabilitated” jihadists are placed right back in their pre-
incarceration environments, which make them more likely to fall back in with other 
jihadists. Yemen also does not have any structured after-care program for released 
detainees. Some former detainees were given employment or financial assistance while 
others were not. In Saudi Arabia, former jihadist prisoners are housed at a halfway house, 
the Care Rehabilitation Center in a Riyadh suburb, for further counseling and 
reintegration back into society. Participants are monitored after release and are required 
to check in regularly with the program officials.  
A. SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES 
A comparison of deradicalization programs in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia 
and Singapore shows that each have had some success with the use of certain methods. 
The examination also highlights some of the detriments to success of the programs. For a 
deradicalization program to be viable, it must address certain elements: 
• Reform within the prison structure: As the numbers of jihadist 
prisoners increases, the available resources to deal with them in the prison 
environment are strained.244 The ability to segregate extremists from the 
general population is important in preventing radicalization. The prison 
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structure in many countries and the large numbers of incarcerated 
individuals can make this impossible. Further, corruption within the prison 
system can derail any attempts at deradicalization. This is clear in the 
Yemen prison escapes and the Indonesian prison environment. The 
deradicalization program in Indonesia will likely not be viable unless a 
broader program of prison reform is instituted.245 Saudi Arabia has 
addresses prison concerns by building five new prisons specifically to 
support their deradicalization programs. Unfortunately, most countries do 
not have adequate budgets to address this problem. 
• The use of knowledgeable and well-respected Islamic clerics: Radical 
ideologies can only successfully be countered by someone who not only is 
knowledgeable about Islam but can also garner the respect of the 
extremist. Indonesia has found success with the use of reformed extremists 
to counter ideologies. It is difficult for Western and non-Muslim 
governments to create programs to address ideologies unless they have 
active support within the religious communities.246 Singapore has been 
able to elicit significant support within its Muslim communities; however, 
some have questioned the legitimacy of the Islamic scholars involved in 
its program. A difficulty experienced by many Western countries is the 
lack of access to Muslim scholars who the radicals perceive as credible. A 
benefit of Saudi Arabia is that it has a vast number of Islamic scholars that 
can be utilized in the program.  
• Incorporation of cultural norms: The use of cultural values and norms is 
key to the success of a program. Southeast Asian cultures are hierarchical 
in nature. Indonesia takes advantage of this in their use of former senior 
leaders within JI as program counselors. A possible reason for the initial 
success of the Saudi program is the way the Saudi program utilizes 
common cultural responses. The Saudi program uses the families and 
communities of the detainees to influence and control detainee behavior. 
• Monetary support to families of detainees: Singapore has recognized 
the importance of providing support to families of detainees to prevent 
marginalization of the family or further radicalization. The Saudi program 
also addresses the prisoner’s social needs by including families in its 
efforts and providing monetary support, which encourages goodwill 
towards the government, and also prevents radical groups from stepping in 
to influence families.247 Research has shown that spouses and families can 
often be a significant factor in the disengagement of violent activism.248 
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However, a major criticism of the Saudi program is that the extremists’ 
views have not been changed but they have renounced them not due to an 
actual change in beliefs but due to the financial incentives given to their 
families. 
• After-care programs: Prisoners need to be re-integrated into normal 
society. The Saudi program addresses this need. The Saudi program 
participants also continue with counseling and are encouraged to continue 
studying with their program clerics after release. Monitoring prisoners 
after their release is crucial to prevent recidivism. It is difficult to ensure 
that the program participant is actually completely reformed or whether he 
is simply practicing the jihad principle of takeyya in which disinformation 
and deception are justified if their well-being or Islam is threatened.249 
Saudi Arabia recognizes this problem and its counselors make efforts to 
weed out any insincerity among participants. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Terrorist events all over the world have shown that traditional hard security 
measures alone are not effective in preventing terrorism. Deradicalization programs may 
be a possible answer to combating terrorism. With the large numbers of detainees 
imprisoned for security violations and terrorism throughout the world, positive changes in 
their ideologies may alleviate future dangers. “The potential cost of inaction…may 
exceed the high cost of program implementation and the long-term damage of violent 
extremism.”250  
It is hard to evaluate recidivism rates in these various deradicalization programs, 
as records are often not publically disclosed. Some programs are less comprehensive than 
others are. The initial program in Yemen was discontinued in 2005 due to the high rates 
of recidivism. To address recidivism problems, states must dedicate a large number of 
resources to address detainee issues both within the prison system and after the detainee 
is released. Many developing countries do not have the resources to address the needs of 
the participant adequately. Saudi Arabia’s programs have many advantages over other  
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programs. This is due to the amount of resources that Saudi is able to dedicate to the 
program. Mainly, Saudi Arabia has access to a significant amount of rentier income and 
is able to dedicate a large amount of money to the success of the program. 
Deradicalization programs may be the answer to the question of what to do with 
the large numbers of radical extremists currently incarcerated throughout the world. 
Much of the success of the programs will be dependent on the methods used and the 
availability of adequate funding. The relatively newness of these programs prevents a 
comprehensive study of recidivism rates. Saudi Arabia, with its multi-pronged and 
comprehensive approach, shows the most promise of all the deradicalization programs. If 
a deradicalization program proves successful over time, the methods can be incorporated 
into numerous other countries’ programs and possibly alleviate the growing threat from 
Muslim extremists. 
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